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On 9 September 2026, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania (SACL) examined a case concerning restrictions on the freedom of movement imposed on an asylum applicant during the border procedure and established important criteria for distinguishing a restriction on freedom of movement from detention. The Court found that, in the circumstances of the case, the regime applied to the applicant amounted in practice to detention, for which there was no proper legal basis.

The SACL clarified that the application of the border procedure entails an obligation to reside at a location designated in the European Union (EU) Regulation establishing a common procedure for international protection. However, the specific arrangements for implementing that obligation must comply with the provisions of the Reception Conditions Directive governing restrictions on freedom of movement and detention. The Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners must, as far as possible, be interpreted in the light of the wording and purpose of that Directive.

The prohibition laid down in the Reception Conditions Directive against detaining an asylum applicant without establishing a legal ground for detention and individually assessing its necessity, as well as the requirements to provide reasons for detention and to immediately release a person who has been unlawfully detained, are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional. The applicant was therefore entitled to rely directly on those safeguards against a State authority.

Furthermore, where national law cannot be interpreted in conformity with those safeguards, the court must ensure their effectiveness, if necessary by disapplying national provisions that are incompatible with them.

The case arose after the Migration Department decided to accommodate a pregnant applicant for international protection in a reception centre without granting her the right to move freely within the territory of Lithuania while the border procedure was ongoing. The applicant disagreed with that decision and requested permission to reside at temporary accommodation without restrictions on her freedom of movement.

The new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which became applicable on 12 June 2026, provides for a border procedure under which certain applications for international protection may be examined before the applicant is granted the right to enter the territory of a Member State.

The SACL emphasised that the prohibition on entering the territory of the State defines the procedural status of an asylum applicant during the border procedure but does not, in itself, constitute a sufficient basis for depriving that person of liberty. Detention is an autonomous concept of EU law. Consequently, a measure imposed on an individual must be assessed on the basis of its actual substance and effects rather than the designation given to it under national law.

Distinguishing between a restriction on freedom of movement and detention requires an overall assessment, taking into account the individual circumstances of the person concerned, the purpose and duration of the regime applied, the procedural safeguards available, and the nature and extent of the restrictions imposed in practice. Among other factors, this assessment depends on whether the person has a genuine possibility of leaving the place of accommodation of their own free will.

In the case examined, the applicant was able to move freely within the territory of the reception centre but was unable to leave it of her own volition. Leaving the centre required prior individual authorisation and, on one occasion, the applicant was also required to be accompanied by a staff member. She requested permission to leave the centre on three occasions but was never actually able to do so. Having assessed these circumstances, the duration of the regime and the overall impact of the restrictions imposed, the SACL concluded that the applicant had, in practice, been detained.

In this context, the Court noted that under national law a foreign national may be detained for more than 48 hours only by a court decision. The decision of the Migration Department could therefore not constitute a sufficient legal basis for such detention. Moreover, the decision did not specify a particular ground for detention, did not include an individual assessment of the necessity of depriving the applicant of her liberty, and did not explain why the objective pursued could not have been achieved by less restrictive measures.

The applicant’s individual circumstances were also relevant to the case. The Court noted that pregnancy does not, in itself, preclude the application of the border procedure or restrictions on freedom of movement. However, it is a circumstance that must be taken into account in the individual assessment of the proportionality of the measure imposed, the person’s special reception needs, and whether the border procedure may continue to be applied.

In view of the circumstances of the case, the SACL also noted that the concept of detention and the essential criteria for distinguishing detention from restrictions on freedom of movement have already been defined with sufficient clarity in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Accordingly, the interpretation and application of EU law relevant to the case did not give rise to reasonable doubt, and the preliminary question proposed by the applicant was not necessary for resolving the dispute. The request for a reference to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling was therefore dismissed.

The SACL set aside the judgment of the court of first instance and annulled the decision of the Migration Department, ordering the applicant’s immediate release from detention, which had been found to be unlawful. The Migration Department was instructed to reconsider the question of her accommodation within three working days. Until a new decision is adopted, the applicant may continue to reside at the reception centre without restrictions on her freedom of movement: she must have a genuine possibility of leaving the territory of the centre of her own free will and returning to it without separate authorisation.

At the same time, the Court emphasised that release from detention does not, in itself, amount either to permission to enter the territory of Lithuania or to termination of the border procedure. If the border procedure lawfully continues, the person may be required to reside at a designated location; however, such an obligation does not in itself provide a legal basis for prohibiting the person from leaving the territory of the place of accommodation.

Administrative case No. SU-32-575/2026